Trump's African Policy: Prioritizing Commercial Agreements Instead of Democracy and Civil Liberties.
During the first week of December, President Trump convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.
Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”
A Clear Change of Direction
This dichotomy encapsulates the defining feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—even as this fits with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.
“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.
An administration spokesperson stated this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”
Strategic Results and Inconsistencies
This shift is significant, but observers note it is early to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.
“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a senior fellow for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.
Major actions have included:
- Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
- Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
- Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
- Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.
International Disinterest and Tensions
In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.
“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.
A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.
“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.
Quid Pro Quo Relations and Targeted Intervention
A comparable standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.
Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.
The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.
A Resemblance to Competitors
Observers see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.
“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.
Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”
“The engagement that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.